/116 cont./

scanty knowledge; their population varies between 200 and 300. Whereas there in the unexplored south organizational forms for larger numbers of people have evidently developed, the sociological system of the Waika is organized for only the above-named figure of a hundred village inhabitants; a surplus of births is answered by village partition.

The politically independent villages are partners in war and peace and for trading and visiting, and the momentary, frequently changing relationships of the villages to one another give the political situation in Waika territory its stamp. Let us first look at the hostile relationships. Affairs involving women are for the most part the cause of war; if a wife is sought in other villages, and if the offer is turned down, one resorts to abducting a woman. Once there has been bloodshed in quarrels originating from this, the war is self-perpetuating; the original cause has not been forgotten, to be sure, but because of its slight intensity in the conceptual world it in no way suffices as a motive for the continuation of the war. Rather, what does not permit breaking the chain of attacks repeated at intervals of a few months, in which the enemy men are killed, but the women abducted, /117/ is ideas and analogous to blood revenge. Concluding peace is possible only when there has been no bloodshed for a long period of time, and hostile relations often last for generations. Thus Waika country is covered with a network of hostile relationships of varying degrees, and, picking a village at random, one can distinguish a series of villages that are friendly, benevolently indifferent, neutral, sympathetic with the enemy, and, finally, completely hostile. For no two villages, however, is this series completely identical; there are no extensive alliances; war is an affair of the individual village, and a friendly village is aided only if there are personal reasons for hostility. No Waika village is without an enemy, and because of the many crisscrossings of the degrees of relationships the political situation is extremely complicated. We therefore see that even on the broadest social plane -- that of the people as a cultural and linguistic whole -- there is a very pronounced

Surára
Pakidái

/65 cont./

524 child" or "married couple." In the latter game sexual activity
524 is already often involved. As long as the children have not yet
864 reached puberty, the adults laugh about it. It is only the mothers of girls who are a little annoyed when they hear about it. They do not regard it as tragic, however, since they themselves were reprimanded about it by their mothers when they were little girls.

/66/

582 g) Marriage

At the age of 7-8 a girl as a rule has already been given in
585 marriage. The husband is usually 8-10 years older. They do not as yet lead a regular married life, however. During the day the little girl plays with other children, and only at night does she sleep
[833] in her hammock beside her husband. Sexual intercourse, however,
[593] is strictly forbidden until after the second menstruation. She also fetches firewood and water and receives prepared food for herself and her husband from her family. When the tribe is on the march,
[484] she carries the hammock of her spouse and the few household articles. Economic reasons are connected with this marriage in childhood, for the young husband must hunt for his little wife and
606 her parents. Especially noteworthy is the reserve toward in-laws which operate in such a way that son-in-law and mother-in-law never
582 speak to each other and may not visit each other. Since the fear of incest is very great in both tribes, a marriage, which is always agreed upon by the parents, may be entered into only by partners who are not related by kinship. For this reason young wives are preferably obtained from a friendly tribe; in this case, however, the young man must live there until his wife has put her second
583 menstruation behind her. Occasionally young girls and women are abducted from hostile tribes. They are first held as captives and prostitutes for some time, however, before a man may finally marry them. I met such a little female captive among the Surára. She came from the hostile tribe of the Karauaterí and was approximately 15 or 16 years old.

/216 cont./

584 There are cases in which a brother or a friend of the suitor wishes to serve as intermediary and offers to speak to the father-in-law. The gesture is very well received and highly appreciated.

585 During the first two or three days the young husband remains
583 in the forest /217/ hunting; the woman hangs her hammock near that of her husband in the house of the family of orientation,
[476] that is, where she has always lived. This time having elapsed, the man tries to bring together some twenty friends to help him clear the land for the three conucos requested by his father-in-law. Usually he has no difficulty in finding this help. The father of the boy and his brothers do their best to feed the workers well, and, when the work is done, the young husband offers them as presents arrows, bows, etc. which they refuse to accept. Later, the man begins to clear some conucos for his own family.

584 Our informant from the upper Caura insisted that, once con-
627 sent has been obtained, delivery is definite and the girl cannot then accept any other young man. In order to give us an example, he told us what had happened to a man of his group.

A girl had accepted him as a husband, but, because of unforeseen circumstances, he had not had time to talk to the father-in-law. Then the girl surrendered to another young man and married him. The father-in-law knew nothing about the first offer. One day the people of the pueblo found the young couple in their hammock pierced by two arrows poisoned with curare. The murderer informed the father-in-law and the inhabitants of the rancheria of the motive which had caused him to perpetrate the crime. Neither the father-in-law nor the people intervened in the matter, for, according to them, the young lover was right in punishing the two who had deceived him in this way.

584 Sometimes parents marry off their children before they
595 reach maturity. Some men also take a second wife when she is
881 still underage, but they respect them and have no sexual contact with them until after the first menstrual periods have passed.

/473 cont./

583 628 To a suitor who does not obtain the consent of the girl's settlement there is no other path but to look for a wife elsewhere or to try to abduct the girl in order to make her his /474/ wife. If he decides to do this latter, he gathers together his sympathizers; these are mostly men of the suitor's own settlement, although other friends may also help him. The group attempts to take the girl prisoner at a careless moment, carrying her off by force. The friends of the girl come to help her, starting a hand-to-hand fight. If the suitor manages to flee with the girl, she becomes his wife, but if he fails, he cannot make another attempt at abduction without then being considered a real enemy, and as such he will run the risk of being shot with an arrow and not simply have to put on a fight.

If a settlement decides not to accept the abduction committed for one of its girls for matrimonial purposes, a call for help can be made to a neighboring settlement, all of the men gathering in a band, ready to recover her. The weapons used on such a raid are smooth poles about six feet long, intended not to kill the opponent, but to knock him down, leaving him hors de combat. If such a raid is successful, the girl is returned to her parents. And if the raid fails, any new attempt to recover the girl involves the risk of the attackers' being shot with arrows, since they would then be considered as true enemies. Both the men and the women can fight on the defense in case of such a raid.

A suitor alone or with the help of a few friends may succeed in carrying out the abduction of a wife, generally by finding the girl practically alone and carrying her off to his own settlement. In such cases the settlement of the abductor cannot back him, obliging him to return the woman to her parents rather than to lose their friends in her settlement.

721 302 When a raid to a truly hostile settlement is planned for the purpose of abducting a wife or other objects of value, each one of the members of the attacking band paints himself entirely 726 black or dark maroon. For such raids the weapons are the bow and arrows, and, when the fight starts, both groups shoot to kill. Should the attacking band be small, it can only hope to capture some girl or woman who is alone in her "conuco" or /475/ cutting wood in the forest. Then it will try to escape with the

726 /476/ In general prolonged sieges are not attempted, out of fear that someone who came to visit the besieged settlement might have seen the attackers and gone in search of help. As a result of this the source that supplies them with water is generally not defended.

Frequently, before carrying out a larger attack, the attacking settlement moves into the forest so that the families may be sheltered while the men go out to battle.

583 628 If two young persons wish to marry, but one or both of their settlements do not favor their matrimonial union, they may flee to a settlement where they will be accepted and establish their home there. If they do not find a settlement that will shelter them, they must separate and try to contract marriage by the usual means, or they have to abandon their plan altogether.

586 628 A wife maltreated by her husband may flee from him by going to a settlement prepared to defend her, or to one where her husband would not dare go because of being considered an enemy there.

If a wife runs off alone or with another man, the husband may organize an expedition armed with macanas or clubs to regain her, but in this case, too, he can only make one single attempt. If she has taken the children with her, he can try to recover both the wife and the children or only the children, or some of them.

586 If a man abandons his wife, in general nothing can be done about it.

If the man and the woman separate by mutual agreement, the former generally keeps the children. Sometimes the smaller children remain at the side of the mother until they are of sufficient age to cook their own platanos (perhaps five or six years old).

587 The second marriage differs very little from the first marriage. In the majority of cases a virgin is preferred to a widow or to a married fugitive.

581 No man remains unmarried by his own will. If he is unmarried, it is because he has not been able to obtain a wife.

/153 cont./

628 In January of 1952, while many of those from the aldea of
584 Yoeitjeti were visiting in Majecototjeti, a group of men from
/154/ Shibaatía-tjeti came and inquired about "Macluma," about giving her in matrimony to a man from Shibaatía-tjeti, who was already married to her older sister. "Macluma" had just passed puberty, and "Yajicocoue," the husband of the other older sister of "Macluma," also wanted her. The grandmother of "Macluma" persuaded her not to go off with the man from Shibaatía-tjeti unless she never wanted to see her again.

That night the Shibaatía-tjeti suitor asked for Macluma in "singing" fashion, while talking with "Shinaocaoue," the chief /capitán/ of Majecototjeti. The chief called him "old man." He told the chief that if he obtained her, he would be good to her, he would not put fire on her or beat her. I am not sure what conclusion they reached, although I suspect that the chief refused to give her to him.

628 On the following afternoon the men of Shibaatía-tjeti
583 caught "Macluma" outside of the aldea and tried to take her off
584 by force, in what the Yonomama /Yanoama/ call a "shaimau." The Majecototjeti women came to rescue her, and a group got into a fight and into a "rope fight" /lucha de cuerda/ over "Macluma." This lasted for several hours. The men of Yoeitjeti and I myself stood to one side and watched, but did not take part. Finally, the women managed to carry "Macluma" back to her house, and things quieted down.

The men of Shibaatía-tjeti said that they would come back for "Macluma." The men of Majecototjeti said, "If you do, we will shoot you."

After that, when the Shibaatía-tjeti visited them, at most there were groups of two or three.

721 In October of 1953 the Shibaatía-tjeti came one evening
[441] at nightfall and shot a poisoned arrow at a boy, "Bosalima," who was standing at the entrance to the aldea. The wound was not very deep, but was several inches long.

[Introductory, P. iii]

Genealogical data in both sociological and biological form are given for one small village to demonstrate the dual organization tendency. Similar data on two other villages from which this sample village recently split are presented to show that affinal ties between local descent groups are structurally more stable than agnatic ties between such groups, and that these affinal ties hold local descent groups together when larger villages fragment, resulting in the break-up of lineages and the redistribution of their members into mutually hostile, independent villages.

The intensity and tactics of warfare are shown to determine in large measure both the size of the village and the political conditions that promote inter-village alliances based on marriage. Finally, the techniques of slash-and-burn horticulture are discussed to show how economic dependence on cultivated food promotes the establishment of political alliances based on marriage exchanges and determines the direction of movement of relocated villages.

Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, the frequency of intra-village fighting and inter-village warfare co-varies with the frequency with which males may legitimately satisfy sexual desires; anything that increases female/male ratio or the sexual activity of females reduces feuding. Second, the degree to which marriage practice conforms to marriage rules is predictable once the conditions of warfare are specified. When warfare is chronic, alliances between historically unrelated villages require a breach of marriage rules when women pass between these groups. Comparative data on Brazilian Yąnomamö social organization are given to support these conclusions. Third, the data bearing on Yąnomamö social organization support E. R. Leach's contention that the political and economic contexts within which marriages take place must be considered as part of the ongoing social organization and must be included in analyses of the latter. By so doing, the analysis shows that integration between Yąnomamö lineal descent corporations does not necessarily derive from inherent properties cognatic kinship as argued by Meyer Fortes.

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INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of Thesis

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This is a functional study of one form of marriage practiced by the Yąnomamö Indians of southern Venezuela. The form of marriage considered here--recruitment of wives from other villages for the purpose of initiating and maintaining political alliances--constitutes a departure by the Yąnomamö from their preferred form of marriage. I wish to emphasize the point that these marriages constitute a predictable and necessary departure from the ambilateral cross-cousin preferences. I will show in the space below how a number of variables are related to each other to bring about the exceptional marriages.

The fact that normative rules of behavior and actual behavior differ considerably from each other in most societies has received little theoretical attention, particular in regard to analyses of marriage systems. For the most part we presume that exceptions to stated marriage preferences represent a measure of the breakdown of the society under consideration, due to contacts with other societies. Yąnomamö exceptional marriages[1] cannot be dismissed with this line of

[648]

[1] Of 56 recently contracted marriages in three of the villages investigated, 31 cases were breaches of the preferred ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules for the purpose of establishing political ties between the groups of the spouses.

121 reasoning, as most of the Yąnomamö villages are presently
583 uncontacted, and those that are in contact with foreigners
582 have only recently (since 1951) entered into these contacts.
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583 Yąnomamö marriages, even the preferred form, are
582 influenced by the milieu of inter-village hostility within
*628 which they are contracted. Marriages in this milieu have as
613 their major function the promotion of social ties between the descent groups represented in the exchange and are best understood as the deployment of women between groups with the purpose of promoting political and military alliances. The groups in question may be of two kinds: the local patrilineages comprising a particular village, or the members of different villages as such. As the only corporate group among the Yąnomamö is the local lineage, marriages within and between villages are to be understood as alliances between different corporate groups.[1]

583 The variables affecting marriage practice--weakness
582 of descent as a solidarity-promoting medium, village size
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*621 and instability, the chronic nature of warfare, the shortage
921 of women, attitudes about aggressiveness and demonstration
152 of ferocity by individuals, and economic practices--are such that some deviation from the normative marriage rules is necessary to insure maximum survival chances for the resi-
583 dents of the various autonomous villages. Because marriage
582 exchanges in general have political and military implications,
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*[621]

[1]Yąnomamö villages are not corporate groups.

583 582 621 actual marriage practices reflect the immediate political and military needs of a given village. If it is more 583 582 183 628 advantageous to dispose of a woman in a way that promotes greater solidarity between allies, the marriage rule is not followed.[1] An eligible female, therefore, is given to a man (perhaps unrelated) in another village if her kinsmen have reason to believe that they may be required to take refuge in or request military aid from that other village.

628 574 726 562 An ally's demands are not to be taken lightly, for to fail in an obligation to an ally may have the graveat consequences for survival; one tactic of Yąnomamö warfare is invitations to feasts during which a disgruntled group kills the male guests and seizes their women. These treacherous feasts (nomohoni) occur often enough, so that local groups 628 583 582 are always suspicious of their allies. A dependable ally is won at the expense of women. Failure to hand over enough women creates a frustrated ally who is extremely dangerous. Yąnomamö political behavior has largely to do with disposing of enough women to make the ally loyal, but not to give more women than is necessary to achieve this end; miscalculation in this respect has serious consequences. As it is imperative for local groups, for reasons to be outlined below, to have allies, it is likewise necessary for them to enter into marriage exchanges with other groups.

[1] When women are given to men from other villages, the men rarely, if ever, are related to them as FaSiSo or MoBrSo. The exchange of women for purposes of alliance usually establishes the initial kinship ties between the groups of the wife receivers and wife givers.

attain a certain size; beyond this point the causes of internal fighting are too numerous for peace to be maintained effectively by kinship ties, and the village breaks up into smaller, more cohesive units. This affects the degree to which deviations from the marriage norm occur: first, the female cross-cousins of an eligible bachelor are usually in villages that are hostile to his own, and he is obliged to seek a spouse in another, currently friendly, village. Secondly, as his own village is now more vulnerable because of its small size, some of its eligible females must be given to men in other villages in order to promote military alliances.

Village size and demography

The significance of demographic data has only recently received recognition in analyses of social systems. The importance of such data in the analysis of marriage practices has been most tellingly illustrated by F. G. Rose's study of the Groote Eylandt Aborigines (1960). Rose was able to show that where men marry women who are considerably younger than themselves, two important consequences follow: primary marriages with father's sister's daughter is effectively prevented, as is the practice of sister exchange.

Similarly, Ackerman (1964), in a critique of Needham's analysis of Purum marriage, showed that demography-dependent data such as frequency of 'marriage acts' (ibid., p. 60) do not support Needham's contention that the Purum

121 have a prescriptive marriage system. What the Purum say they do and what they actually do are two distinct things.

*621 578 922 As I mentioned above, after Yąnomamö villages reach a certain, critical size, they tend to fragment into smaller groups. The internal tensions that promote this instability are to some extent offset by external military pressures: members of a faction within a larger village may want to establish their own independent village to avoid club-fighting and to suppress more severe forms of violence; but if their village is being raided by members of other villages, [241] it may be impossible for them to do so. Occasionally a village splits into several factions, each establishing its own garden apart from the other, but the factions are forced *621 *623 722 583 582 578 [502] to reunite because of raids mounted by other groups. Generally, the process of village splitting precludes a later recombination of the same factions because these remain hostile to each other. Thus, the small, vulnerable villages that result from the fragmentation of a larger village are constrained to make marriage alliances with other villages, both to insure military assistance and because it is difficult to obtain women from their kinsmen with whom they are now at war. Village size and the balance of marriage exchanges between villages indicate that numerically weak villages are *621 *623 722 583 582 438 coerced by their stronger partners to give up women. In some cases, the disposition of desirable trade goods may affect the balance in the exchange of women between two villages. In general it may be said that, when one village

is allied to another which can provide it with more military assistance and desirable trade goods than the former can give to the latter, an imbalance in the exchanges of women will follow. The imbalance will favor the village that, for reasons of size and of existing military patterns, least needs the military aid of the other.

The character of Yąnomamö warfare is not as intimately related to village size as might be expected, although, of course, larger villages are best able to conduct warfare successfully over a long period of time from one location. Larger villages are less likely to be forced to abandon their location because of raids from smaller groups, whereas smaller groups are markedly vulnerable in this respect. Nevertheless, no one village is large enough to withstand successfully military pressures from a cluster of smaller, allied villages, and, therefore, the members of all villages seek defensive alliances with their neighbors. Such alliances are based on the exchange of women.

Other demographic factors, in addition to sheer size of villages, affect marriage practices. The ratio of males to females, for example, is high, partly because of the practice of female infanticide. Moreover, the shortage of women is compounded by other factors; sexual intercourse is prohibited with pregnant women and those who have nursing children, and polygyny causes an unequal distribution of the available women. It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences for Yąnomamö social organization of this single

phenomenon: the feuds that lead to the splitting of villages and the cause of fighting between villages are largely the result of the shortage of women.

Within villages, then, the bachelors and those men whose wives are either pregnant or are nursing children constantly threaten village stability by seeking liaisons with the wives of other men. The discovery of these liaisons usually leads to violent fighting between the group of close relatives of the woman's husband and that of her lover; and this frequently causes the village to split. The larger the village, the more likely it is that such liaisons will develop and that the subsequent fighting will lead to fragmentation of the village.

Village size, then, is limited by the capacity of the kinship network to regulate internal feuds, and by the nature of the actual or current warfare pattern of the neighboring villages. As the village grows in size, the incidence of extra-marital affairs and club-fights appears to increase, while the ability of kinship to regulate the affairs of a multi-lineage village diminishes in proportion. Villages then split into smaller groups that comprise two or more small, cohesive, intermarrying local lineages; each group establishes an independent village and enters into marriage alliances with other villages. The prior existence of hostilities with other villages may delay the split, but does not prevent it. In short, the relationship of Yanomamö village size to village solidarity nicely illustrates Leslie

*621 White's generalization that

> every society tends to behave in such a way as to achieve that balance between size and solidarity that will give it the maximum effectiveness in carrying on its life-sustaining activities. (1959:104)

*621 *628 562 583 582 921 Belligerent ideology and aggressive behavior

Village size plays an important role in the nature of the political relationships between groups that are not linked by kinship ties. As mentioned above, larger villages tend to use their strength and dominance to upset the exchange balance of women. But the degree to which a powerful group is able to force a dependent ally to cede women is limited by the ability of the smaller group to raid the larger village successfully. In ideological terms the *611 *628 724 152 181 Yanomamö express this capacity to wage war by placing emphasis on and valuing aggressive behavior. It is considered both proper and desirable to act ferociously, as this informs neighbors of the group's capacity to wage war and warns them that the group is willing to resort to war in political dealings.

*621 *628 526 574 152 Members of small villages are consequently constrained to behave militantly toward larger neighbors to limit the coercion that the larger group may be tempted to try. Their fierce behavior takes the form of threat, bluff, chicanery in trading and, most important, challenges to duels. Frequently, when villagers are invited to feast with an allied group, the invitation includes a challenge to a chest-pounding

duel. Such a duel functions to remind the allies that the host is strong and willing to display his strength to protect his sovereignty.

The practical effect of this kind of behavior is that the solidarity of political alliances is constantly threatened. Allies are always suspicious of each other's intentions, and political ties between them are tenuous.

Although the giving of women in marriage between allies serves to promote solidarity, the capacity for marriage to achieve this end in itself is limited by the constant displays of hostility and aggressiveness by both groups.

The display of ferocity is manifest at the local, village level also. No insult is too slight to go unnoticed and unchallenged. Indeed, most individuals seize upon these opportunities to display strength. Thus, a legitimate way for men to display aggressiveness is for them to beat their errant wives, to burn them with fire brands, to cut their arms and legs with machetes or to shoot them in a non-vital part of the body with a barbed arrow. Men constantly intimidate their wives and respond cruelly to the slightest provocations, such as the wife's failure to act quickly on a husband's demand for food. Men who are brutal to their wives are feared and respected by other men, for the implication of this behavior is that the man will behave equally fiercely if insulted by another man.

Men often prefer to have a wife from another village, upon whom it is easier--and safer--to vent ferocity and

cruel actions; that is, the extent to which husbands are brutal to their wives is largely a function of the number of kinsmen the women have within the village, particularly brothers. Some men have even killed their wives in fits of rage, but in all the cases for which I have complete data, the women came from other villages and had no kinsmen in their husband's village to protect them. Conversely, when women have brothers within the village, their husbands exercise restraint in their treatment of them, knowing that the brothers of the women will use force to defend them. It is not unusual for a man to take his sister away from a cruel husband and to give her to someone else; this inevitably leads to club-fighting and frequently causes the village to split.

Ideological considerations, therefore, promote friction and fighting within villages and lead to village splits; and, the newly formed factions are obliged to seek marriage alliances with other groups.

Economic practices

Local groups abandon residential and horticultural sites only when forced to do so by the raiding pattern of their enemies. For the most part, the Yanomamö are able to predict the hostilities that will force them to abandon their gardens, and they plan accordingly. The first act of a war is frequently the clearing of a new garden at some distance from the presently occupied site. If hostilities develop within the village and it is expected that these will

*621 escalate, the factions involved usually use the interlude
*578 between a club-fight and actual killings to establish sepa-
24 rate gardens.

*621 Occasionally, however, a village suddenly becomes
*629 embroiled in a war that it has not expected, or fighting
24 within the village immediately involves shooting to kill.
36 Then the only recourse for the group is to take refuge with
722 an ally and subsist on the produce of the ally's garden. If the critical situation develops out of an intra-village dispute, the smaller of the contesting factions is forced to flee to another village where it has friends or relatives.

If all the members of a village are forced to take refuge in another village, they proceed to make their own garden apart from that of their hosts; then, when the garden begins to produce, the refugee group moves to that site to
• [583] live. They do this because the price of protection is always
582 measurable in terms of the hosts' demanding access to the
939 women of the guests, either as spouses for their own men or simply as temporary sexual partners.

Twice during the lifetime of my oldest Bisaasi-tedi informants their group was obliged to flee to an allied village to escape the raids of powerful neighbors, raids that resulted from the development of intensive hostilities before the group could establish a new garden of its own elsewhere. On both occasions the refugees lost a number of women to their protectors, and in neither case did they receive wives
*728 in return. Indeed, on the second occasion, the hosts planned
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*628 126 574 to kill all the male guests and to abduct the women, but the hosts themselves unexpectedly became involved in a war and required the aid of their guests.

*628 24 722 361 Yąnomamö dependency on cultivated foods, then, promotes political alliances with other villages; the warfare pattern is such that the members of a village may have to flee from their site to avoid the raids of their enemies. If they have not had time to establish a new garden, they need the support of an ally until they are able to support themselves.

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121 * 583 582 The variables that affect Yąnomamö marriage practices are numerous and diverse and combine with each other in complex ways. I shall show in the chapters that follow how these variables actually affect Yąnomamö marriage practices. At this juncture the point to be made is that Yąnomamö social practice in real life can not be completely isomorphic with the stated marriage preferences because the milieu within which marriages take place simply precludes such a neat fit. A functional, rather than a structural analysis seems to be demanded by the nature of the variables in question. I shall also show the degree to which we can predict actual marriage behavior, given specific information about the variables.

[726] [182] Finally, I should add that the Yąnomamö constitute a significant case for ethnological inquiry: this society offers

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

121 us the opportunity to estimate the effects of warfare on the
583 nature of marriage practices among a people who are chroni-
582 cally at war, a situation not frequently found in the present
182 ethnographic world.
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128 **B. The Data and Field Techniques**

Several kinds of data are required to illustrate Yanomamö marriage practices and the variables affecting them. The most important data are those I obtained from genealogies and the historical relationships between villages.

In total, I have genealogical data on some 3,000 individuals, living and dead, from 15 villages. Not all the data are comparable in quality and I shall confine my discussion to the populations of the five villages for which
128 my data are most complete. These five villages fall into
*621 two groups with regard to their historical origins. Three
*628 of them have a common history, separating initially about 1943 at which time two villages were formed.[1] One of these split again about 1954 to form two villages, giving a total of 3 separate but closely related villages. The other two of the five selected for this study also have a common history, but are distinct from the first three. For purposes of clarity I will refer to these two villages as Shamatari (see Chapter 5 for discussion). About 1960 the two Shamatari villages split from each other and are presently on good terms.

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[1] See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the historical relationships of these villages.

At Patanowã-tëka she was given to Husiwã, by whom she had two sons (Orakuwã and Kariunawã). The approximate date of her move to Patanowã-tëka is 1935; it could not be much later, because a war broke out between Matakuwã's group and the group at Patanowã-tëka shortly after this date, and no visitors went between these two villages after hostilities commenced.

When the Patanowã-tëka group separted into two villages, Nabëyoma remained with the group that is presently called Patanowã-tedi. The two splinter groups entered into hostilities with each other shortly after they separated, and Nabëyoma's husband, Husiwã, was one of the first casualties. Nabëyoma, her co-wife (Shǫrökoma), and all their children fled from Husiwã's group and joined the other, cognate, group. Shǫrökoma, originally abducted from yet another Shamatari village, later returned to Patanowã-tedi, but Nabëyoma stayed with Patanowã-tedi's enemies. In 1951 when the treacherous feast was pulled on the group to which Nabëyoma belonged and the group fled to Mahekodo-tedi for protection, Nabëyoma was given to a man in Mahekodo-tedi, Remoriwã, as part of the cost of the alliance.

While Nabëyoma lived at Mahekodo-tedi, Barker and his colleague, David Landon, discovered that she still remembered how to write her name (Elena Valero). They informed the authorities in Puerto Ayacucho that a Brazilian woman was living with the Yąnomamö, presumable abducted by them from one of the settlements across the border, but

847 562 162 Several kinds of demographic data suggest that the rate of female infanticide is high. Table 1 gives the sex ratios of five Yąnomamö villages. The sex ratio for the total population sample (576 individuals) gives a more meaningful estimate of the rate of female infanticide, as there is considerable variation by village in the value of the sex ratio. The excess of males in the total population (8%) gives a first 562 approximation of the frequency of female infanticide. The 162 628 722 variation in the sex ratio by the village, on the other hand, expresses the political relationships of the villages to [583] their allies. That is, the distribution of women in these five villages is a function of the military requirements of the particular villages in the marriage alliance network. Thus, the cline in sex ratio from Reyabobŏwei-tedi to Bisaasi-tedi (ignoring the Patanowŏ-tedi, who are not allied to the other groups) reflects a dominance gradient in politico-125 military requirements of each village. The total sample of 847 162 576 individuals must be considered in order to estimate the 628 562 frequency of female infanticide among the Yąnomamö, but the political relationships between the villages must be understood to account for the variation by village of the value

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[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 64]

847 562 162 114 982 selves, it is highly unlikely that men will marry a FaSiDa, despite the kinship terminology. Rose did not, however, consider the possibility that sibships may have a systematic bias in their composition; if males tend to be older than their sisters considering all sibships, the probability that a FaSiDa is of marriageable age is increased. I specifically questioned the relationship between female infanticide and FaSiDa marriage, and the Yąnomamö denied any correlation between the two practices. There can be no doubt, however, that the occurrence of FaSiDa marriage among the Yąnomamö is made more probable by female infanticide.

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of the sex ratio, and the distribution of the women among them.

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In Chapter 5 I will show how the two Shamatari villages, Reyabobŏwei-tedi and Mŏmaribŏwei-tedi, participated in a treacherous feast during which they killed a number of their kinsmen from Mŏwŏraoba-tedi. This feast committed the two Shamatari villages to an alliance with the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi in which the latter two villages were, in a political-military sense, less dependent on the support of the Shamatari than the Shamatari were on them. The Mŏmaribŏwei-tedi and the Reyabobŏwei-tedi represented the front of the Shamatari expansion into the unoccupied Mavaca River area. The territory they abandoned as they expanded to the west was subsequently occupied by other Shamatari villages, the members of which were historically related to them.[1] By participating in the treacherous feast and becoming enemies to their congeners, the two Shamatari villages subordinated themselves to the interests of the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi. Since they formed a buffer between the villages of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi on the one hand, and the Shamatari village of Mŏwŏraoba-tedi on the other, they bore the brunt of the raids mounted by the latter in revenge for the treachery. In short, they had only two dependable allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi. Their dependence on these allies was transformed into an im-

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[1]See Chapter 5, "The History of Paruritawŏ-tedi."

Their dependence
*628 on these allies was transformed into an im-
• 583 balance in the exchange of women between the two groups of
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562 villages, accounting for the variation in sex-ratio given for
*621 the villages in Table 1.

*628 The degree to which each village is dependent on its
583 allies is roughly indicates in Table 1. The Reyaboböwei-tedi,
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722 being closer, geographically, to the MöwÄraoba-tedi, suffered more from the revenge raids of the latter. In other words, they needed military aid from their own allies to a greater extent, and have, accordingly, lost far more women to their allies as a consequence. But the true situation is even more remarkable than suggested by the sex ratio for the Reyaboböwei-tedi; a large percentage of the women in their village have been abducted by them in raids against the MöwÄraoba-tedi, i.e., they have actually lost more women to their allies in exchanges than is suggested by the sex-ratio alone.

*621 Again, the sex ratios for the Bisaasi-tedi and the
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*628 Monou-tedi are misleading without additional information.
583 These two villages would seem, from Table 1, to have gained a remarkable number of women in the political alliances they
162 made with their Shamatari friends. This, however, is not the
*628 only reason they have such a high percentage of women in
*621 their populations. In 1950 these villages were victimized
726 by the MöwÄraoba-tedi and the Iwahikoroba-tedi in a treacher-
627 ous feast. They lost approximately 15 men. Were two-thirds
165 of these men alive today, for example, the resultant sex ratios for the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi population would more accurately reflect the dominance gradient, measured

in terms of women ceded to them by the Shamatari, that they maintain over their Shamatari allies.

The sex ratio data give a rough idea, then, of the extent of female infanticide and, in addition, reflect the political relationships of the villages to each other in terms of the flow of women. Other demographic data, however, suggest that the practice of female infanticide is even higher than the sex ratios alone indicate. Table 2 gives the stated cause of death of 240 adult individuals. These individuals are related to the living members of the three villages of Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi. It is immediately apparent that more men die in warfare than women,[1] implying that the frequency of female infanticide is substantially higher than the 8% suggested by sex ratio data.

There are several ways the Yanomamö remedy their woman shortage. Young bachelors, for example, practice sodomy (bei kä bosi kuwemou, bei kä bosi waumou) with each other. These relationships develop into a 'buddy' system (äawä) and promote ties of friendship that extend into adult life. Some of my informants confidentially told me that particular young men had been known to copulate with dogs in estrus, but this was regarded with contempt by all who knew about it. Homosexuality, however, was not considered despicable, but it was thought to be infantile. Most of the

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 62]

[1] Twenty-two per cent (31/138) of all male deaths were due to warfare, while only 6% (6/102) of female deaths were due to this cause.

avoid the raids from the PatanowÃ-tedi, the man in question used this opportunity to have an affair with KonoreiwÃ's wife, presuming that he would not be discovered because the village was filled with people. He was discovered, despite his discretion, and challenged to a duel by KonoreiwÃ. The entire village participated in the club fight. KonoreiwÃ punished his wife by hitting her in the mouth with a glowing fire brand, severely burning her lips.

Finally, and most drastically, the woman shortage is remedied by raiding other villages to abduct women. This, however, is war. The ever-present possibility of this occurring, however, is a constant threat to the stability of political alliances, for allies occasionally turn on each other with the intent of seizing females. It is largely for this reason that allies cede women to each other peacefully by contracting marriage alliances. In November 1964 the PatanowÃ-tedi arrived at Bisaasi-tedi to participate in a feast. This was the first time the groups had gathered as groups since they separated from each other on hostile terms in ca. 1944. They intended to make peace at this feast, but a party of men from Monou-tedi, a village that also formed part of the group before the 1944 split, arrived uninvited and abducted seven women from the PatanowÃ-tedi. This ultimately provoked a war between the PatanowÃ-tedi and Monou-tedi, and determined the settlement pattern of both groups, as well as their political activities, all during my field work. The war was still being actively prosecuted when I

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these situations[1] by establishing new gardens as new wars develop; occasionally, however, the wars take on unpredictable intensity before new gardens can be established, and the members of the villages concerned necessarily seek refuge with their allies.

To the Yąnomamö, gardens (hikari) are the fount of subsistence. They acknowledge the relationship between chronic warfare and village relocation by being constantly on the lookout for new lands to settle. Men are always discussing the agricultural merits of the forested areas in which they hunt, and most new sites are selected on the basis of information collected by hunters. Thus, when the Namowei-tedi split up at Patanowä-tëka, the Bisaasi-tedi faction moved to Shihota, an area they knew well because they customarily hunted there.[2] In 1965 the Monou-tedi cleared a new garden at Moyanaböwei for the same reason. I accompanied hunting parties from Bisaasi-tedi on several occastions to new areas not normally frequented by these hunters, and the topic of agriculture invariably came up during the evening résumé of the day's experiences.

Other factors besides density of jungle, type of floral association, and general topography are considered by

[1]They avoid these situations because the hosts usually demand either sexual access to the women of the refugees, or wives for their bachelors. The refugees, of course, are reluctant to do either, but are frequently obliged to do both. The cost of the alliance, once again, is measured in terms of women lost.

[2]See Map C, and Chapter 5.

162 562 83 sexually, by the practices of sodomy, wife sharing, incest, and permitted affairs. However, two ways in which the problem 162 562 583 is resolved--clandestine affairs within villages and raiding to abduct women between villages--create political situations 849 721 722 *628 that favor the development of political alliances for the purposes of defense. Since these involve the transfer of women between the allies, the practice of female infanticide constitutes a functional component in the marriage alliance system.

*621 *628 578 241 722 The process of village splitting, growing out of feuds over women, results in the establishment of small, militarily vulnerable villages. The timing of the split is conditioned by the agricultural requirements of the village on the one hand, and the nature of its politico-military relationships with other villages on the other. The graded system of violence permits flexibility in the settlement pattern and the precise conditions of a village split. Because the Yanomamö rely heavily on cultivated foods, alliances may be interpreted as an attempt to maximize the chances of survival of groups of kinsmen as independent groups; the possibility always exists that a given group may be forced by its enemies to seek protection and provisions in the village of an ally.

CHAPTER III

DESCENT, MARRIAGE, KINSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

As noted in the introduction, the largest Yąnomamö political unit, the village, is structurally unstable and tends to fragment into hostile factions once the population of the village reaches a certain size.[1] Village splitting results in the establishment of smaller villages the members of which, for considerations of defense, make alliances with other villages, basing the political ties on the exchange of women. The dynamics of village splitting can be illustrated in a number of ways. In Chapter V the histories of particular villages are set down in some detail, illustrating the nature of the causes of internal struggles. In this chapter, however, I shall discuss the aspects of Yąnomamö descent, marriage, kinship and political ideology that illustrate the role each plays in determining the nature of feuds. This will provide the background for the next chapter, the analysis of village splitting in terms of the genealogical composition of recently established villages.

A. Yąnomamö Corporate Lineal Descent Groups and Marriage

Corporate lineal descent groups tend to be closely

[1] Village size is discussed in the next chapter.

613 his brothers, terminologically, they have more in common with
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*621 each other than they do with him. As he depends on them for
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582 support within the village, he is under obligation to them and can not take their suggestions lightly.[1]

*621 Again, if there are two politically important descent
613 groups of the same lineage within a large village, and if
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562 there are, in addition, a number of agnatically related
584 females not belonging unambiguously to either one, problems
736 arise over the disposition of the women; there will be rivalry between the two descent groups concerning the marriages (or remarriages) of these women. Situations like these arise when the father and brothers of the women are killed in raids or die of other causes, or when the woman's first husband dies after her (deceased) agnates arranged her marriage. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, split into two villages, each led by members of the same lineage. They had been victimized by a Shamatari group which killed a large number of men during a treacherous feast. There were a number of women, consequently, who were ambiguously related to the surviving males of the Upper and Lower halves of Bisaasi-tedi. One of the descent groups in what is now Lower Bisaasi-tedi managed to gain the upper hand in the

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[583] [1]There seems to be a marked tendency for the daughters of such men to be given to men in other villages when alliances are made. I am unable to say, on the basis of my present data, whether such alliances are forced on these men by their agnates, or whether these men in fact prefer to dispose of their daughters in this way. This practice tends to keep such men more isolated from their agnates and prevents them from establishing strong affinal ties within the village.

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disposition of these women and their children, a factor that did not contribute to the amity of relationships between the two agnatically related descent groups.[1]

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A girl's marriage is arranged by her close male kinsmen. Her father has the greatest influence in the decision as to which man she will be given. If the man had adult sons, their opinion can overrule the decision of the father. If a girl marries within the village, she can depend on her agnates for protection against a cruel husband. Ideally, a woman prefers to marry her FaSiSo or her MoBrSo.[2] If the marriage rule is not followed, women prefer to be given to a non-kinsman within the village.

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Men are obliged to perform bride service in the village of their inlaws, after which they may take their wife back to their natal village. Occasionally a woman leaves her natal village to seek a husband in another village, but this is always against the wishes of the girl's agnates. Such situations usually develop into wars between the village of the girl and the village that took the girl. The war between

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[128] [1]See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this incident.

[801] [2]By FaSiSo I do not exclusively mean the biological relative, although he, too, would be included. By extending their kinship terminology, the Yanomamö also include non-consanguines in these categories of relatives. For example, a young man in Bisaasi-tedi married his FaBrWiBrDa while I was in the field. To him, the girl was his MoBrDa because FaBr was 'father' and 'father's wife' was 'mother'; the girl, therefore, was MoBrDa.

the Namowei-tedi and the Boreta-tedi (Chapter V) developed out of a case such as this.

When women are given to men in allied villages, the local descent group of the girl (her father and adult brothers and, to a lesser extent, the girl's more distant agnates) decides which patrilineage of the foreign village should have her. Smaller villages are more prone to enter into alliances based on marriage exchanges than are larger villages, since smaller villages require allies to a greater extent than larger ones.[1] Local descent groups in small villages are more cohesive than descent groups in larger villages because they usually comprise a man and his adult sons; if there are distantly related agnates in small villages, these are incorporated into the local descent group. In small villages, therefore, local descent groups are more corporate because all the adult agnates of the girl have a say in her marriage. Ideally, they give the girl to a member of the politically strongest descent group of the allied village, for this group is the one from which aid will come or, conversely, the one most likely to make the decision to initiate hostilities against the smaller village.

The longer an alliance endures, the more likely it is that the exchange of women balances. The two largest

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[1] Larger Yanomamö villages can make visiting alliances with other groups that do not lead to marriage exchanges, as it is relatively unimportant to them to stabilize such alliances by ceding women to militarily inferior groups.

628 lineages in Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi have
582 exchanged women with each other for a number of generations.
583 Male members of the Hor lineage entered into 29 marriage acts[1]
613 with women of the Sha lineage.[2] An identical number of acts involving Sha men with Hor women also took place. In the exchanges between Mõmaribõwei-tedi and their two allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, there is presently an imbalance in the exchange of women, although reciprocity appears to be developing; a number of women from the latter two villages are promised to members of Mõmaribõwei-tedi--to members of lineages that have already given women to the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi.

628 An imbalance in the exchange of women implies a dif-
613 ference in political strength between the two groups that
582 exchange women, and the mechanics of the exchange are shaped
583 by this difference in political strength. Post marital resi-
591 dence is viri-patrilocal after the groom performs bride service, but the length of the bride service is determined by the relative political strength of the two villages concerned. If the village of the groom is more powerful than that of the bride, the groom may be able to return to his village with his wife after just a few months of bride service. If the

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[1] See Ackerman, 1964, for a definition of marriage act.

[2] Yanomamõ lineages are not named. I have named them for expediency of analysis after the oldest identifiable member of the lineage, abbreviating the name to three letters. "Sha" lineage, therefore, is the name I have adopted for the patrilineal descendents of a long since dead individual called Shamashiadima.

bride's village is stronger, the girl's parents may be able to press the groom into a prolonged bride service—five or six years. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, are politically stronger than the Reyabobŏwei-tedi, one of their Shamatari allies. They have obtained a number of women from this group, and the men involved all returned with their brides after brief periods of bride service. So far, not a single Bisaasi-tedi woman has gone to live in Reyabobŏwei-tedi, although one girl is married to a man from that village. The man has already spent several years in Bisaasi-tedi, and will probably spend at least as many more before being permitted to return home with his Bisaasi-tedi wife. The military and political superiority of the Bisaasi-tedi is so conspicuous in this alliance that one Bisaasi-tedi man literally dragged a woman, previously promised to him, out of the Reyabobŏwei-tedi village, against the wishes of both the woman and the woman's agnates. He was not prevented from doing this because the Reyabobŏwei-tedi need the political and military support of the Bisaasi-tedi and could not afford to react violently to the affront. Had the two villages been politically equal, the incident would have resulted in a war.

Women involved in exchanges between villages have no say whatsoever in their fate. Most of them abhor the possibility of moving to a strange village, largely because they fear that they will be mistreated by their husbands. Should a girl refuse to abide by the decision of her agnates, she has no alternative but to flee the village. Koima, a girl of

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*423 Koima, a girl of
613 some 15 years, was promised to Rerebawë, a young man from
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* 583 Karohi-tedi, an ally of the Bisaasi-tedi. Rerebawë had
606 already been given Koima's older sister, Shihotama, by whom he had two children. Rerebawë wished to return to his own village, as he had performed a lengthy bride service. His parents-in-law, however, wanted him to remain in Bisaasi-tedi permanently, as they had no sons to help them with the gardening or to provide them with meat. Rerebawë began making frequent trips to his own village. His wife's parents feared that he might not return, so they kept his wife's children in Bisaasi-tedi, knowing that she would return even if her husband did not. This coercion was not working effectively, and Rerebawë was growing impatient. His parents-in-law, therefore, promised him Koima, their second daughter,
584 provided that he remain in Bisaasi-tedi. Koima, however,
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591 refused to go to Rerebawë, suspecting that he would not keep
578 his promise to remain in Bisaasi-tedi. She preferred, instead,
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613 Bïkotawë, her classificatory FaSiSo. She began an affair with
* 624 Bïkotawë, making no attempt to be discreet. This infuriated
627 Rerebawë, who challenged Bïkotawë to a club fight. Bïkotawë belonged to one of the important lineages in Bisaasi-tedi and was cognatically related to the members of the headman's
[626] descent group, another important lineage. Public sentiment was on Bïkotawë's side, but the girl belonged to a descent group over whose affairs Bïkotawë's supporters had no claims. Rerebawë's challenge was legitimate, for the girl was promised to him by her agnates: Bïkotawë was, in effect, having an

affair with his wife. The parties in question armed themselves with sharpened clubs and faced each other in the center of the village, but actual fighting was averted. Despite the legitimacy of Rerebawë's claims, no one stepped forward to take his side in the feud, so he backed down. After this incident, Rerebawë threatened to kill Koima, but the headman dissuaded him. Koima and her mother then fled to Monou-tedi and took refuge with kinsmen there, reducing the probability of Rerebawë shooting Koima. Her mother tried to coax her into abiding by the wishes of her kinsmen and go to Rerebawë, but she obstinately refused. She ultimately eloped with Bïkotawë, and the two of them fled to a distant village on the Padamo River. Rerebawë discovered where they had gone and attempted, unsuccessfully, to recover Koima. If she returns to Bisaasi-tedi she will be given to Rerebawë, who will have ample reason to thrash her soundly.

B. Yanomamö Kinship[1]

The structural relationships between descent groups within Yanomamö villages can be expressed in terms of dyadic kin ties. Considerable theoretical attention has been devoted to this analytical procedure in recent structural treatments

[1] Migliazza (1964) published a kinship diagram for the Ururicaa Yanomamö. Although the terms differ from those current among the Upper Orinoco Yanomamö, the pattern (Iroquois) is the same. I defer discussion of the complete kinship terminology to a later publication, as there are enough peculiarities in usage to warrant a more complete treatment than would be appropriate here.

I. Marriage Ties

602 593 583 583 [609] Marriages bind the groups of the spouses to each other in a system of exchanges involving goods, services, and the promise to reciprocate women at a later date. Yąnomamö marriage is peculiar in that the ties between husband and wife are very weak, but that ties between a man and his sister's husband are strong. The significance of marriage as an institution that initiates (or continues) alliances between non-agnatic groups stems, therefore, from the nature of the ties that it creates between the male members of the allied groups.

593 Ties between spouses are usually very tenuous, due largely to the fact that men are constantly suspicious of their wives' motives whenever the women leave the village unescorted. Men always suspect their wives of infidelity, and will even beat them if there is the slightest suspicion that the women have been seeing other men. A certain amount of 839 593 trysting goes on in all villages, but it is more frequent and more easily accomplished in larger villages. Discovery of [578] liaisons by the cuckold inevitably leads to club fighting between the factions of the lover and the husband. The woman 593 684 involved usually suffers more than either of the male principals in the fighting that follows, as women are severely punished by their husbands. The punishment usually consists of a beating with a club, but men frequently shoot their unfaithful wives with barbed arrows in a non-vital area of the body, such as the buttocks or leg. In one instance I witnessed,

609 601 groups of Yanomamö have begun referring to the entire tribe as "Los Shori." The Yanomamö address the missionaries with this term hoping to maximize their chances of obtaining desirable manufactured goods such as machetes and axes.

609 521 601 Men who are not related by blood constantly remind each other of obligations when they use this kinship term. A brother-in-law deserves respect, fair treatment, and gratitude. As the term is reciprocal, a conversation between two shoriwë is punctuated frequently by these constant reminders that each owes the other goods, services and respect by virtue of the fact that they stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other. Such conversations, usually about material goods or women, strike the outsider as something of verbal contests to determine which of the two speakers is more of a shoriwë than the other, i.e., who owes the other more goods, services, gratitude and generosity. One who has actually given a sister to the other's group has an advantage, in a trading sense, as he can more legitimately claim goods from the wife receiver.

628 574 609 601 583 When men visit the village of an ally to beg, trade or participate in feasts, they call all non-related men of that village 'brother-in-law,' emphasizing the fact that they stand in wife-giver relationship to them, and deserve, therefore, the generosity of the hosts.

628 527 574 583 581 Alliances between villages involve, in addition to military aid, mutual feasting and trading. It must be remembered that alliances, no matter how many marriage ex-

*628 574 527 [573] [581] changes bind the villages to each other, are weak and unstable. The more frequently allies visit and feast with each other, the less likely treachery will take place, as a certain amount of trust and friendship is generated by visiting and feasting.

*628 438 433 The tendency for Yąnomamö villages to create artificial shortages of certain manufactured items is related to feasting and the creation of organic solidarity of a sort. After Yąnomamö villages enter into alliances, they tend to adjust their economic production of such items as bows, arrow cane, spun cotton, tobacco, baskets, cultivated drugs, dogs and clay cooking pots. Any village is capable of producing all of these goods, but allied villages create shortages of some of these items so that they can become dependent on the productivity of their allies, thereby having excuses to visit and trade.

*628 438 527 574 607 One of the most significant relationship in trading between villages is the shoriwë tie, and these men trade with each other whenever they visit. As a trade frequently involves feasting, the specialization in production of specific items leads to greater solidarity between allied villages. Although it would be an error simply to identify the role of shoriwë with that of trading partner, this aspect of the shoriwë tie, particularly between men of different villages, is by no means negligible in accounting for the solidarity this relationship promotes in inter-village political ties.

*628 438 527 574 The way the trading is conducted also contributes to

284 personal names provides an adequate excuse to exhibit rage and ferocity.

593 621 Personal relationships between brothers, therefore, tends to be one of mutual respect and reserve when the brothers reach adulthood. Age, however, confers a certain amount of status in Yąnomamö society, and an older man can command a younger adult brother to do tasks for him, provided their ages are considerably different. An older brother is expected to defend a young sibling in fights and assist him in obtaining a wife. A number of young men in Bisaasi-tedi obtained wives from polygynous older brothers. Young men, on the other hand, assist and support older brothers more willingly than they will a brother of similar age, as siblings of similar age deliberately demonstrate that they can not be bossed around by an equal.

*621 602 591 Co-residence influences the strength of the tie between distant agnates in some instances. If, for example, a man has no close agnates in a village but there is a group of more distantly related agnates, the man tends to be absorbed as an equal in that group. In fact, he may be affectively closer to his co-residential agnates despite genealogical distance than to close genealogical agnates who live in other villages. Upper Bisaasi-tedi, for example, is led by Kąobawë of the Sha lineage. All agnates in his following are at least one degree of blood removed from him[1] but they behave as if they were

[1] See Figure 3, "Upper Bisaasi-tedi, Chapter IV.

628 602 613 726 [622] same lineages. The warfare between the two groups, therefore, was largely a struggle between groups of distantly related agnates. Kɛobawɛ̈, the headman of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, participated in the raiding against the Patanowɛ̈-tedi. In one skirmish, he shot his classificatory brother, Rakoiwɛ̈, but Rakoiwɛ̈ survived the wound. This man is as closely related to Kɛobawɛ̈ as most of the men that presently constitute his agnatic following in Upper Bisaasi-tedi, again illustrating the significance of co-residence in determining the strength [583] of the agnatic tie. Two young men from Patanowɛ̈-tedi recenlty joined the Bisaasi-tedi to obtain wives. After they arrived, the Bisaasi-tedi and the Patanowɛ̈-tedi resumed their old [606] hostilities. The fathers-in-law of the two men recruited [573] both of them into raiding parties that attacked the Patanowɛ̈-tedi, and both men participated willingly, despite the fact that their actual fathers and brothers live in Patanowɛ̈-tedi. One of the young men, Sirorowɛ̈, told me that he would have avoided shooting his own father (Yoyosiwɛ̈) and actual brothers, but would have shot more distant agnates.

628 726 602 607 622 That the brother-in-law tie is stronger than the tie between distantly related agnates is also illustrated in the history of a war between Mahekodo-tedi and Yabitawɛ̈-tedi. These two villages are led by men who are classificatory brothers. The war stated when a man from Boreta-tedi, a brother-in-law of the headman of Mahekodo-tedi, was killed by the Yabitawɛ̈-tedi headman in a club fight. As the slain man's sisters were married to the Mahekodo-tedi headman, the

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726 latter felt obliged to revenge the man's death by raiding
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607 his classificatory brother's village.
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Similar cases occur in internal village fighting.
624 Hunobawä, an Upper Bisaasi-tedi man of some 60 years, gathered
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593 a stalk of bananas from his garden and hung them in the roof of his hut to ripen. His son, Dikawä, 18 years old, discovered the ripening bananas and ate a large number of them without the consent of his father. When Hunobawä discovered the loss, he went into a rage and attacked Dikawä with a club. Dikawä got his own club and began assailing the old man. This precipitated a general free-for-all in the village, as large numbers of men took one side or the other in the melee.

628 Club fights between historically related but separate
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578 villages also pit agnates against each other. When Bisaasi-
613
583 tedi's Lower Group seized a girl that the Monou-tedi had abducted from the Patanowä-tedi, a club fight was arranged to settle the dispute. But, the most important factions in Monou-tedi and the two Bisaasi-tedi groups were local descent groups of the same lineage, and their headmen were classificatory brothers. Although the dispute and club fight ultimately involved all the able-bodied men of each village, the fight was initiated by distantly related agnatic groups of the same lineage.

602
578 Some dyadic kinship ties are more stable than others. It is not possible to say, however, that any one in particular is so inherently stable that fighting between such kinsmen can not occur. Certain kinds of violence, however, are not

602 capable of becoming stronger in time. When two descent groups
602 exchange women with each other over several generations, the
612 582 cognatically related members of the two groups have strong
583 ties with each other. Further exchanges between these groups
is largely a validation of the previously existing implicit
60 obligations to exchange women. MoBrSo is, whether or not you
582 marry his sister, a shoriwë. When the marriage rule is followed,
and it is a number of times each generation, the ties between
shoriwë are correspondingly strengthened by the exchange.
602 Agnatic ties do not have the potential of increasing in soli-
darity; the tendency seems, in fact, to be just the opposite.

602 The major components in the variation of the strength
561 of agnatic solidarity are genealogical closeness, relative
621 age, and co-residence. To provide a crude measure of the
128 591 relative importance of these variables, I have arbitrarily
assigned values to the components in Table 3. A strong tie
is scored as "***" and a weak tie as "---". By adding the
number of asterisks in each possible combination,
a rough measure of relative solidarity of agnatic type is
given. For example, agnates who are closely related genea-
logically (A_1: "***"), who differ significantly in age
(B_2: "***") and who live in the same village (C_1: "**-") rep-
resent a class of agnates having the greatest relative
solidarity. The sum of the asterisks for this combination
is 8.

In Table 3, combinations whose scores are 3 and 4
respectively constitute the class of agnates having the least

602 561 *621 *628 It is not easy to represent affinal ties in this fashion, as there are too many factors that determine the strength of the relationship between such kin types. A few observations, however, will provide a contrast with the analysis given in Table 3 above. Among affines, age differential is relatively meaningless so far as internal village stability and strength of inter-village alliance is concerned. [606] When the age differential corresponds to a difference in genealogical level, the affines, such as son-in-law, tend to be related by stable roles based on avoidance, bride service obligations, etc., but these derive not from age differential, [606] but from the generation difference. A son-in-law is subordinate to a father-in-law despite his age, and inter-personal behavior between such kinsmen is not greatly influenced by [591] age differentials. Second, co-residence is largely irrelevent unless it reflects cognatic ties that came about through previous marriages in ascending generations. Again, current political relationships between the two villages of the affines is important in determining the strength of the tie, or whether the affine intends to return to his own village. *628 *621 602 • 583 Affinal ties do not necessarily imply previous historical relationships between the groups of the affines, whereas agnatic ties presume a common history. When members of two historically distinct villages enter into marriage alliances with each other, affinal ties between the respective villages are weaker than affinal ties between members of two villages that have a common history and have exchanged women in the

*628 *621 602 583 past. Finally, there is no way of scoring 'promises' to exchange women, and the strength of the shoriwĦ tie between members of two distinct villages is largely a function of such promises.

*621 602 618 Summarizing the difference in agnatic and affinal ties, the important point is that affinal ties have the potential of changing in their coefficient of solidarity when exchanges between two descent groups continues over time. It is largely for this reason that villages reduce to clusters of affinally related dual organizations (paired patrilineal local descent groups) that have exchanged women in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future.

C. Ferocity and Bellicosity

773 828 According to the Yąnomamö Moon Myth, Uhudima, a Spirit, shot Moon with an arrow. The drop of blood that fell to the earth flowed over the surface, causing all Yąnomamö to become fierce. Ever since that time the Yąnomamö have behaved fiercely, because they were born in blood.

828 577 The Yąnomamö regard themselves as being violent, coercive, crafty and quick to display aggressiveness; they 829 648 value this behavior. Yąnomamö contacts with other tribes and with civilized foreigners have been consistently hostile until about 1955. They have succeeded in exterminating one tribe,[1] and have caused a number of villages of another tribe to relocate in order to avoid the attacks mounted on them by

[1] The Makú; see Migliazza, 1965.

*621 organization is only approximated, however, as an examination of the genealogies given in Appendix A will show. The smaller the village, the more conspicuous is the tendency for the composition to approach a moiety-like structure. Larger [613] villages are more composite and may contain as many as four or five distinct lineage segments.[1]

*621 The tendency for small villages to be characterized 613 by two (and only two) dominant lineage segments, each linked to the other by marriage ties, recurs with sufficient frequency to permit me to use a simple dual organization model as the [829] basis of the analysis of village structure. The model given in Figure 1 should be taken as only a heuristic devise in the discussion of Yąnomamö village structure that follows; the Yąnomamö do not conceive of their villages as being bifurcated into two groups, for in most instances they are not. And, small villages soon lose their moiety-like structure as they begin to include males and females from villages with which marriage ties are made.

602 The relationships between kin discussed in the pre-
607 vious chapter are all given in Figure 1. The adult males in
582 Generation 1 exchange sisters[2] and are, therefore, related to
• 583 each other as shoriwä (brother-in-law). This is a well-defined, stable, non-ambiguous relationship; the males in

[128] [1]See Appendix A for a discussion of village composition. Details of one small village are given in the Appendix, but the composition by lineage is summarized for three other villages.

[2]In Figure 1, $A_{1.1}$'s wife is the sister of $B_{1.2}$.

602 607 582 583 Generation 1 have essentially solidary relationships to each other, at least in terms of the model.

The males of Generation 1 are related to the females *[621] of that generation as either husband or brother. Ties between siblings of the opposite sex are affective and promote village solidarity.

613 602 Males of lineage A in the second generation are simultaneously sister's sons and daughter's husbands of male $B_{1.2}$, both relationships being conducive to solidarity. They are [583] bound to $B_{1.2}$ by affective ties and obligations to perform bride service. An analogous set of relationships binds the Generation 2, lineage B males to $A_{1.1}$. The males of both lineages in the second generation are related to each other as either brother or brother-in-law, both relationships being stable within the assumptions of this model (see below). The

*[621] FIG.1: Ideal Yanomamö Village Composition



128 extending the model one more generation, maintaining the pattern already shown in the model, the numbers of individuals included in the new figure would approach the size of a small Yanomamö village. But, by extending the model one generation, we begin to put stress on one of the relationships, the tie between agnates of the same age, if we simultaneously introduce additional factors such as a sex ratio greater than 1.0. I can illustrate the same stress in Figure 1 by assuming that polygyny occurs. Presume that individual $A_{2.1}$ is older than his brother and is given both of the daughters of $B_{1.2}$ for his wives. As individual $A_{2.2}$ gets older, he will have no sexual alternative but to seek liaisons with the wives of his older brother, as all other women in the diagram stand in incestuous relationship to him. In Figure 1 $A_{2.1}$ and $A_{2.2}$ are drawn as full brothers. When situations of this sort occur, the older brother may give one of his wives to the younger brother, or at least permit him to have sexual relationships with one of them until he procures his own wife. If, however, we extend Figure 1 by another generation and specify the same conditions in Generation 3, the males involved are one degree of relationship more remote from each other. Were we to introduce the factor of woman shortage in addition to polygyny, the rivalry between agnates for the women in Generation 3 would increase accordingly, and fighting would likely result: distantly related agnates of the same age are ambiguously related to each other regarding both the disposition of women and acquisition of women for spouses.

128 that Lower Bisaasi-tedi approximates a dual organization of
*621
613 two intermarrying lineages, Sha and Tom.

There are two senses in which Lower Bisaasi-tedi is
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*621 not representative of the typical Yąnomamö village: the sex
*628 ratio is nearly 1.0, i.e., there are about as many females as
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• 583 there are males in the village, and the group is politically stable and cohesive; not a single fight took place within this group during the 15 months of my field work. The sex ratio is explainable by several factors. First, the members of this village have been particularly successful in forcing their Shamatari allies to cede women to them while at the same time have managed to avoid reciprocating the exchanges. Secondly, a large Shamatari family from Mǫmaribǫwei-tedi recently took refuge in the village, a family that comprises
[529] two males and four females. Finally, many of the men killed
[574] in the 1950-51 treacherous feast were from this faction of
[726] Bisaasi-tedi.

*621 The solidarity of Lower Bisaasi-tedi stems from a
622 number of factors. First, all adult men are married. More
613
602 importantly, the core lineages (Sha and Tom) are linked to each other in three generations by marriage ties, and the leader of this village, Reromawë, has astutely manipulated

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128 logy.) The Tom lineage is the dominant political group in a
*621 number of villages north of the Orinoco River in the vicinity
*628 of Maata-u (see Map B, Chapter II). These villages trace
613 their origins back to a single group (indicated as Husirawë-urihi-tedi on Map C, Chapter V) to which the members of Namowei-tedi were allied about 1900. All living members of the Tom lineage found today among the Namowei-tedi are in Bisaasi-tedi's lower village, where they constitute a major political bloc in the affairs of that group.

actual brothers of these women were killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast,[1] and the women therefore had few agnates to contest Reromawë's actions; his rights to dispose of these women increased after their brothers were killed in the feast. Because of the previous marriages between the members of the Shä and Tom lineages, Reromawë was already MoBr to the politically most important males in the Tom lineage, and he could command respect from them by virtue of the fact that he was of the ascending generation and principal wife-giver to them. He in fact gave two daughters to one of these men. When he re-defined one of his classificatory daughters as sister, he advanced his position in two ways. First, he then became shoriwë to the man that was married to this sister (the man was already SiSo to Reromawë), compounding the cognatic tie (SiSo) that linked them with an important affinal tie (shoriwë). Second, he was able then to claim a daughter of this 'sister' as a wife for his own son (despite the fact that it was incestuous), creating additional stable ties between the two lineages on another generational level.

In another, similar, case, Reromawë re-defined a different classificatory daughter as 'sister,' making it possible for her son to marry his daughter. This was a strategic move, for the man involved was of the Hor lineage, a dominant political group in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi. Thus, by manipulating the kinship system, Reromawë advanced his own position as village leader and managed to

[1] See Chapter V.

*621 622 613 602 subordinate his potential competitors by the way in which he disposed of the women and/or their children.

*621 613 602 562 582 • 583 There are a number of individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi who are not related agnatically to either the Sha or the Tom lineages. These individuals do not, however, constitute a political bloc; each is tied by marriage to the two lineages, and are therefore subordinate (by virtue of obligations to their wife-givers) to the members of that lineage. Most of these individuals are females, and do not represent a political factor in the affairs of the village. Some of them were abducted from Shamatari villages in the past, and a larger number of them were obtained in marriage alliances from other Shamatari recently. The six adult males of this non-agnatic group who might pose a threat to the stability of the village by making liaisons with married women are all married themselves. With the exception of two brothers, they are unrelated to each other. One of them is married to Reromawä's daughter, another is married to his son's daughter, and the two brothers (actual WiBrSo to Reromawä) are married, respectively, to Reromawä's classificatory son's daughter in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and will move there while he does his bride service, and a classificatory brother's daughter.[1] The remaining two men are in Faction B. One of these joined Reromawä's group before 1945 to get revenge against the

[1] This woman is one of the seven abducted by the Monou-tedi from the Patanowä-tedi and taken, in turn, by Reromawä's group from the Monou-tedi. Technically, then, Reromawä is her 'father' and the man to whom she was given is 'son-in-law' to Reromawä. See Chapter V.

*621 members of his own village, Hasaböwä-tedi, who killed his
613
602 father. Reromawä's group was then actively raiding Hasaböwä-
562 tedi. The man was given a wife in Reromawä's village, the
582 widow of a Tom man killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast.
• 583 The man's two daughters are married to Sha men.[1] The last man and his family joined Reromawä's group in 1965 to take refuge from his own villagers, the Mõmariböwei-tedi, some of whom wanted to take his wives away from him for being brutal. He had previously given a daughter to a Tom man and when he was forced to flee from his own village, took refuge with his son-in-law. Appendix A gives more details on each individual discussed above.

*628 Lower Bisaasi-tedi has political ties with a number
582 of villages. It has recently (since 1960) entered into al-
583 liance with two Shamatari villages, Reyaboböwei-tedi and Mõmariböwei-tedi, and has managed to obtain a number of women from the latter village as wives for young bachelors
*628 in the group. The Mõmariböwei-tedi visit them frequently to
627 feast and trade, and the members of Lower Bisaasi-tedi
574 reciprocate the visits. The ties between Lower Bisaasi-tedi
438 and the Mõmariböwei-tedi are nearly as strong as the ties
602 between Lower Bisaasi-tedi and any of its cognate villages to whose members the Lower Bisaasi-tedi are agnatically re-
*628 lated. Of the villages that are cognate to Lower Bisaasi-tedi,
602 Monou-tedi is perhaps the most dependable ally, because the

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[1] Reromawä's actual son, and Reromawä's classificatory son in Upper Bisaasi-tedi.

aid of allies such as the two Bisaasi-tedi groups, the Monou-tedi probably could not survive as an independent village because of the size differential between themselves and their enemies. It is noteworthy, however, that the Monou-tedi are more independent than the Lower Bisaasi-tedi, for they moved to a new site rather than recombine (permanently) with their agnates in Bisaasi-tedi. This avoidance pattern is not a probable alternative for the Lower Bisaasi-tedi because of their relative lack of potential to conduct effective warfare, even considering the fact that their allies would aid them. Lower Bisaasi-tedi would invite raiding by moving further away from Upper Bisaasi-tedi, as their erstwhile neighbors and allies, from whom they have managed to obtain so many women, would be more equal in strength and would demand more women from them. Or, other neighbors, such as the Widokaiya-tedi, would descend on them hoping to abduct women, of which the Lower Bisaasi-tedi have many. They have managed to obtain these women from a position of strength, but a large factor in their strength is the fact that they are still dependent on Upper Bisaasi-tedi. Without the latter, they would be in a serious military situation.

Summary

Village splitting develops out of feuding over women; the kinship lines along which villages split reflect the strength of the tie linking descent groups to each other by marriage or promises to exchange women, while at the same time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

COO time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

*621 *623 613 722 SQ3 When villages split, large lineages are redistributed by local descent group affiliation among the several newly established villages. These new groups tend to be quite small, but never fall below a population size of about 40 people for reasons having to do with the successful conduct of raiding. These small villages tend to approximate a dual organisation of intermarrying local descent groups. Newly formed villages enter into military alliances with other villages and exchange women with them. Over time, such exchanges alter the homogeneity of the respective villages and promote the development of new lineage segments within each village. As the village grows in size and as new segments emerge over time, internal village stability reduces and the village then splits again. Village splitting is frequently delayed or inhibited by the existence of an active group of enemies, and even after such a split the newly-established villages may reunite when threat of raid is imminent. When military pressures decrease, the village again fragments into smaller groups. The minimum size of these groups is set by the number of adult men required to effectively conduct raiding. It appears that these small villages would fragment into even smaller groups if warfare were to cease.

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historical relationships between villages to properly interpret marriage ties between them. With regard to the last point, I found that numerous individuals in Bisaasi-tedi claimed to be from Patanowë-tedi; my initial conclusions concerning their marriage to individuals from Bisaasi-tedi was that the marriages were village-exogamic. I was obliged to reassess these marriages after I learned that the two villages were at one time one village, and most of the marriages between the two groups were contracted while the groups were living together. I therefore investigated in detail the historical relationships between all the villages in the Mavaca area, a portion of the results constituting the subject of this chapter.

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I have summarized the village movements in Tables 5 and 6 and have indicated these movements graphically on Map C. The reader may, if he wishes, skip the details of the histories and turn at this point to the concluding remarks of this chapter. I can make the four points by using only Tables 5 and 6, in conjunction with Map C. However, I cannot illustrate Yanomamö political behavior without recourse to details of the village movements and the wars that caused them and, accordingly, I include the details of the histories in this chapter. The political relationships that presently obtain between the two Shamatari villages (Mishimishimaböwei-tedi and Bayaboböwei-tedi) and their allies, the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, can not be completely understood without knowing their respective histories in some detail. Most of the

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[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 149]

marriage alliances on which I have complete data have taken place between the Shamatari and the two villages of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi. Over 50% of recently contracted marriages[1] that represent breaches of the marriage rule preferences were the result of alliances between the villages whose histories are given here. It is, accordingly, important to understand the political and historical circumstances that led to these alliances.

A. The History of the Namowei-tedi Group

The Namowei-tedi lived in four different areas between ca. 1880 and 1943, splitting into two villages in 1943 shortly after they moved to their fifth location. I outline below the events that led to the abandoning of the first four areas and discuss in more detail the activities of the villages after they established their fifth location. I will treat the Pararitawë-tedi group similarly in Part B of this chapter.

Area 1: Konata-tedi (See Map C)

While living in this area the Namowei-tedi were on friendly terms with several Shamatari villages, numbering them among their allies. The Shamatari as a distinct group were just coming into being between 1880 and 1900. Intermarriages between the Namowei-tedi and members of several Shamatari villages occurred and a number of individuals in the present villages of Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowë-tedi trace descent back to Shamatari ancestors.

[1] These data on marriages are taken from the villages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

descent back to Shamatari ancestors. Shihowë-tedi and its splinter village, Mokayëaba-tedi, were two Shamatari allies of the Namowei-tedi in this period of the latter's history.

The Namowei-tedi got into a war with a cluster of villages allied to Obotawë-tedi over a woman from the latter village. The woman joined the Namowei-tedi against the wishes of her own people. This led to a club fight between the two groups and, later, to a shooting war. Obotawë-tedi recruited aid from their allies, the Bokoiwë-Urihi-tedi, Boreta-tedi, and Aramata-tedi while the Namowei-tedi were supported by the two Shamatari villages mentioned above. A number of men from each of the two groups were killed in the raiding that developed and several Namowei-tedi women were abducted. Obotawë-tedi and their allies forced Namowei-tedi to abandon their garden and take refuge with the Wareta-tedi, a group that had just abandoned the area (ca. 1890-1900) occupied by the Namowei-tedi because of a war with the Boreta-tedi. As the Namowei-tedi had not had time to make a new garden when the raiding became intense enough to force them to move, they moved into the village of Wareta-tedi and lived off the produce of the latter's garden.

Area 2: Wareta-tedi

The residents of Wareta-tedi had their own war with Shihowë-tedi when they were joined by the Namowei-tedi, but were on friendly terms with Husirawë-urihi-tedi, a village to their north. The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowë,

[Namowei-tedi Group]

The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowë, and some of his kinsmen went to visit their allies on the latter's invitation, but Husirawë's group treacherously killed Shamaiyowë and two of his followers. Not wanting to participate in the raiding against their old allies, the Namowei-tedi established a new garden and moved away from the Wareta-tedi. A number of individuals in the present populations of Patanowë-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi trace descent back to the headman of Wareta-tedi, as the latter had demanded women in return for his protection. In ca. 1910 the Namowei-tedi moved to their new garden at Namowei.

Area 3: Namowei-tedi

This area is quite mountanous and the group took its name from one of the ranges, Namowei-kïkë--"sharpness." They lived here long enough to make three different gardens (Makei, Shodemi, and Amatakë), but ultimately were forced to abandon the area because of renewed raiding from their old enemies, the Boreta-tedi. Having no friends to the north and several old enemies to the east, the Namowei-tedi moved west and established their garden at Hąhoyaoba-tëka in ca. 1920.

Area 4: Hąhoyaoba-tedi

The old allies of the Namowei-tedi, the Wareta-tedi, were forced to abandon their site and move west. They settled in the area immediately south of the Namowei-tedi, splitting into two villages (Hasabëwë-tedi and Ashadowë-tedi), and continued to remain on good terms with the Namowei-tedi.

174 628 726 583 Several marriage alliances were developing between the Namowei-tedi and one of the Shamatari villages (Konishuma-tedi) when the war with Sibarariwë's group started, but these eventually broke down before any women were actually exchanged.

194 621 628 The second important event was the secession of a section of the Namowei-tedi from the main group and the development of hostilities between these cognate villages.

194 361 628 996 The third event, occurring somewhat later, was the initiation of hostilities between one of the Namowei-tedi sections (Patanowë-tedi) and villages to its north; this war is being conducted vigorously at the present time, and has dictated the movements of the Patanowë-tedi from the time it began until now.

194 628 781 721 In order, the particulars of these three events are, briefly: (1) The Namowei-tedi were on friendly terms with the Shamatari villages to their south and southeast for a number of years after they moved to Patanowë-tëka. However, [195] several Namowei-tedi died in an epidemic (probably malaria) about 1940, and survivors attributed the deaths to the Shamatari, accusing them of practicing harmful magic against them. Shortly after the deaths occurred, a young man called Ruwahiwë, Sibarariwë's older brother, visited the Namowei-tedi. Namikinininiwë, who now lives in Monou-tedi, murdered Ruwahiwë with an axe while he rested in a hammock, thereby avenging the deaths of the people who died in the epidemic.

Shortly after Ruwahiwë was murdered, his village began mounting raids against the Namowei-tedi, but succeeded

[Namowei-tedi Group]

only in killing a man from Konabuwa-tedi. This man was living with the Namowei-tedi while performing bride service. The Namowei-tedi reciprocated the raiding and captured many women. Some of these women are still living with the Bisaasi-tedi (Yanarima, Waiyuruma, Nekurama, and Hikarima) and the Patanowë-tedi (Iahinarima, Rubrobemi, Rokuobemi, and Shiaomi), one died of a snake-bite shortly after her capture, two died recently after reproducing in Patanowë-tedi (Reisimi and Brararama), and three escaped (Breiurama, Darama, and Boroama).

(2) Around 1940 the Namowei-tedi split into two factions, each making a new garden further up the Shaniahani-u River and abandoned Patanowë-tëka. The move was stimulated by the frequency of fighting within the village: "We were many and were always fighting with each other," said one of my informants, "so we decided to separate from the others in order to keep peace." Both groups claimed ownership of the peach palm trees each had planted at Patanowë-tëka, and returned to collect the fruit each season from their new gardens. Ownership rules stipulate that peach palm trees belong to the individual who plants them. A man from one of the factions took the palm fruit belonging to a man from the other faction one year; the latter reciprocated by stealing plantains from the garden of the former, precipitating a club fight between the two villages. The club fight temporarily settled the dispute, but the two groups parted on strained terms. The smaller (Brararaböwei) of the two factions abandoned their site, fearing that they would be raided by the other group (Wanidima),

[Namowei-tedi Group]

where. In 1949 they moved from Shihota-tëka to Kreibŏwei, a garden on the Shamata-u branch of the Mavaca River.

(3) The Wanidima-tedi began to split into three groups in the mid '50s: Kashawë and Waiyari were the two new gardens established by the factions of Wanidima-tedi. The separation was actually completed in so far as each garden was being exploited by one of the factions, but the three factions were forced to reunite when one of them got into a war with several villages from the north side of the Orinoco. The three groups abandoned their gardens and returned to Patanowë-tëka, and became known as the Patanowë-tedi.

The war with the villages north of the Orinoco started when Yabitawë-tedi and Kashorawë-tedi men killed a man from Boreta-tedi in a club fight. The headman of Mahekodo-tedi, Shinanokawë, was married to the sisters of the Boreta-tedi man, and began raiding the Yabitawë-tedi to avenge his death. A man from Patanowë-tedi was doing bride service in the latter village and was killed by raiders from Mahekodo-tedi, involving the Patanowë-tedi in the war against Mahekodo-tedi. Shortly after this event, men from Yabitawë-tedi visited Patanowë-tedi and, finding the men gone, seized a young girl who was in puberty seclusion. The Patanowë-tedi then began raiding the Yabitawë-tedi, forcing them to take refuge with their allies, the Kashorawë-tedi. Hasabŏwë-tedi, then an ally to both Patanowë-tedi and Yabitawë-tedi, took the side of the latter in the dispute and commenced to raid

[Namowei-tedi Group]

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mouth of the Mavaca River. The Paruritawä-tedi had split from Sibarariwä's village about 1945, and had not been involved in the treacherous feast of 1950 in which the Kreibŏwei-tedi lost so many men. The Paruritawä-tedi were still on good terms with Sibarariwä's followers, and the members of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi persuaded them to invite Sibarariwä and his group to a feast. Using their agnatic ties and existing friendship, the Paruritawä-tedi succeeded in getting the followers of Sibarariwä to accept the invitation, but a malaria epidemic prevented all but a handful of people from actually attending the feast: five men and four women. With the assistance of the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, the Paruritawä-tedi killed three of the guests and seized all four of the women.

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By participating in this treachery, the Paruritawä-tedi subordinated themselves to the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi. At the present time the Paruritawä-tedi live in two villages, and are intimately involved in a bride-exchange network with the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, the latter two villages receiving more women (and men doing bride service) than they give. The Paruritawä-tedi have no other allies, as they are the front of the expansion into this region and the only villages to their east are allies of Sibarariwä. Despite the fact that they would like to make friendly contact with Sibarariwä's group again, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, as we shall see, prevent them from doing so by chicane and threat. Thus, Monou-tedi and the

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

628 583 Bisaasi-tedi are the dominant partners in the bride-exchange network with their Shamatari allies, a dominance that is reflected in the disproportionate number of women they have managed to coerce out of their allies.

361 621 114 While I conducted my field work the Bisaasi-tedi lived in two villages on opposite banks of the Mavaca River. The group on the east bank was beginning to split by the time I left the field, and the split took place a few months later,[1] one of the factions moving to the north bank of the Orinoco River, but still within view of the other group.

B. The History of the Paruritawë-tedi

174 621 The Shamatari came into being as an identifiable group shortly before 1900. The Shamatari identity, as I have shown above (p. 28 ff.), is a function of the historical connections between the villages that split off from Shihowë-tedi's parental group, as well as geographical considerations.

My informants consistently spoke of two 'true' Shamatari men: Kayabawë (Shamatari) and Matakuwë. The villages of these two men have a common origin, but I was unable to get data on the nature of the events that led to the separation of these two groups. This event took place long before the life-span of my oldest informants, and none of them knew any details of the splitting. By 1875, however, there were two distinct Shamatari groups north of the Orinoco headwaters, one of which bore the name Shihowë-tedi. Kayabawë

195 101 36

[1] Personal communication, James P. Barker.

721 The major effect of these raids, apart from the ten lives
722 they claimed, was that the Patanowë-tedi had to move fre-
361 quently from one site to another. The Monou-tedi, who were raiding the Patanowë-tedi, were being raided intensively also. They, too, had to move frequently to avoid the raids. Both
*[528] groups had to rely on allies to give them refuge during the
[132] dry season, the time of the year when raiding is most intense.
[221] It will be apparent below how crucial allies are to villages
[241] that are being raided frequently, and how agricultural
726 practices necessitate these allies. Finally, the events
602 discussed below will illustrate the degree to which consan-
*628 guineal ties between mutually hostile villages are able to mitigate the hostilities between these villages.

*628 The war between Monou-tedi and Patanowë-tedi
722

After the Namowei-tedi group split at the site of
*[621] Patanowë in the early '40s, the two factions entered into a
[361] period of hostility that lasted until one of the factions, the present groups of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, moved out of the area. Raiding between the two factions ceased after 1950, and each group entered into political alliances with unrelated neighboring villages.

728 In the middle '50s, a rapprochement between the two
624 factions was attempted. A few individuals from Monou-tedi
*628 began visiting Patanowë-tedi, and one of them, Torokoiwë, was
[58] given two wives by the Patanowë-tedi. The rapprochement, how-
*[583] ever, was never effected and the political relationships between

000 the factions still remain on friendly terms.

*621 *628 598 726 105 Material presented in the discussion above--details of the movements of factions that are not relevant to the origin of the five villages considered here--also support the contention that villages split over internal feuds. That villages are structurally unstable is evidenced by the sheer number of village splits and the fact that the related factions enter into hostilities with each other after separating. Data I collected on village movements for other Yanomamö groups support the conclusions I reach here.

*621 *628 602 582 583 105 [613] One can see that the process of village splitting leads to the formation of independent villages that comprise closely-related kinsmen. Intuitively, one can also see that marriages "between" such villages, i.e., between spouses that each claim to be of different villages, do not necessarily represent political alliances between those villages, for in many cases the marriages were contracted between the local lineages involved before they separated. This is not to say that all the cases of this sort can be dismissed in this fashion. Some marriages between ambilateral cross-cousins are in fact properly interpreted as marriage alliances between villages, for occasionally related villages enter into alliances with each other. In these cases, the marriages between them come about for essentially the same reasons that the exogamic marriages between unrelated groups occur. In short, the existence of the marriage rule alone does not account for alliances between related groups that enter into politico-military pacts.

likelihood that marriage practices will depart from the rules governing ideal marriage behavior, then we would expect a reduction in warfare to produce a reduction of this gap. A decrease in warfare should obviate the need for military alliances validated by exchanges of women; under such conditions marriage practice should conform more closely to preferential rules.

The Yąnomamö who live on the Upper Uraricoera and Uraricaá rivers of northern Brazil differ markedly in a number of traits from the Venezuelan Yąnomamö of the Mavaca basin considered in this thesis. A major point of difference is that among the former warfare is much less common than it is among the Yąnomamö described in the preceding chapters. It is likely that this reduction in warfare is partly due to more frequent contact of the Brazilian Yąnomamö with Carib-speaking Indian tribes (Makiritare and Arekuna) and, since 1958, with Christian missions. There appears to be a cline in the decreasing intensity of warfare from southwest, the area in which I conducted my field work, to northeast, the area from which these new data are drawn (see Map D, next page). Yąnomamö from the Upper Padamo River, an area about on the mid-point of this cline, told me that fighting with clubs was very rare in their villages. Migliazza[1] asserts that raiding between villages on the Uraricoera River occurs only every four or five years and is usually provoked by

[1] Personal communication.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 195]

accusations of sorcery or by the desire to abduct women.

Another major difference between the Uraricaá and the Mavaca Yąnomamö is the manner in which they treat extra-marital liaisons. On the Uraricaá, liaisons are tacitly permitted and fighting rarely develops between a man and his wife's lover. Should fighting occur, it is generally caused by some incident unrelated to the affair itself. In short, men permit their wives to have extra-marital affairs, provided the women are discreet.

Of major analytical significance is the fact that the Uraricaá Yąnomamö closely adhere to their rules of ambilateral cross-cousin marriage.[1] This stems from the fact that political alliances between villages there never involve the transfer of women from one group to the other. The Yąnomamö of the Uraricaá are endogamous within each congeries of villages having a common history. It would seem, therefore, that the absence of intensive warfare permits marriage practice to follow marriage rules.

The Uraricaá settlement pattern and village organization differ considerably from those found among the Yąnomamö of the Mavaca basin. What I have called a small village of 40 people among the latter segments, on the Uraricaá, into clusters of extended family units separated from each other by as much as half a mile (Migliazza, 1964). The village in which Migliazza lived, for example, comprised 89 persons

[1] Migliazza was not able to give me statistical data on actual marriage practices. I intend to collect this kind of information in January-February 1967 when I visit the Uraricaá area.

114 121 602 -- Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes, and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants not predictable from first principles regarding the putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a function of the politico-military ends served by marriage and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

121 I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

000 11. Didihoma. See #28, Manasinawë, below.

159 12. Dimörama. This girl was abducted from a distant Shamatari
921 village (Kohoroshi-tedi, probably in Brazil, on the Upper
923 Cauaburi River) by the Reyaboböwei-tedi and Mömariböwei-
583 tedi. Her husband--the man to whom she was given after
▶621 being abducted--shot her in the stomach with a barbed
578 arrow, wounding her gravely (see Shiborowë, below). The man was forced to flee from the village and take refuge in Lower Bisaasi-tedi, as other men in the village planned to use this incident as an excuse to take his wives from him. In late 1965 a party of men from Lower
159 Bisaasi-tedi, including Shiborowë, set off for Mömariböwei-
✱623 tedi to 'visit.' I accompanied them on their invitation.
123 They were going to Mömariböwei-tedi to take Dimörama away
721 from her protectors by force, if necessary, and asked me to come along knowing that I always travelled with a gun, presuming that my presence, with a gun, would aid in their objective. The girl was very nearly dead when we arrived (four months had passed since she was shot, and the wound was badly inflected). As the Bisaasi-tedi were one of the only allies of the Mömariböwei-tedi, they gave up the girl without much argument, since she would have
[999] died anyway. (The New Tribes Missionaries took the girl to the Territorial Capital by canoe for surgery in January 1966. She recovered from the wound and is presently living in Lower Bisaasi-tedi.)

159 21. Kakoma. This is one of the seven women abducted from the
●583 Patanowë-tedi in late 1964 by the Monom-tedi. She was
587 taken from her Monou-tedi husband by force by the Lower
✱628 Bisaasi-tedi and given to Kpobauwë, one of the village
721 bachelors.

000 23. Katabema. See Shiborowë, below.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

115 for being fierce long ago, and other men respect him. He also has five mature brothers
[622] who support him, and he has given a number of his sisters to other men in the village,
[156] thereby putting them under some obligation to him. In short, his "natural" following (kinsmen) is large, and he does not have to constantly display his ferocity. People already respect him and take his suggestions seriously.

Rerebawä is much younger, only about twenty-two years old (See Fig. 1-3). He has just one wife by whom he has had three children. He is from Karohi-teri, one of the
[582] villages to which Kąobawä's is allied. Rerebawä left his village to seek a wife in Kąobawä's group because there were no eligible women there for him to marry.

[156] Rerebawä is perhaps more typical than Kąobawä in the sense that he is concerned about his reputation for ferocity and goes out of his way to act tough. He is, however, much braver than the other men his age and backs up his threats with action. Moreover, he is concerned about politics and knows the details of intervillage relation-
[622] ships over a large area. In this respect he shows all the attributes of a headman, although he is still too young and has too many competent older brothers in his own village to expect to move easily into the position of leadership there.

• [583] He does not intend to stay in Kąobawä's group and has not made a garden. He
[591] feels that he has adequately discharged his obligations to his wife's parents by providing them with fresh game for three years. They should let him take the wife and return to his own village with her, but they refuse and try to entice him to remain permanently in Bisaasi-teri to provide them with game when they are old. They have even promised to give him their second daughter if he will stay permanently.

Although he has displayed his ferocity in many ways, one incident in particular shows what his character is like. Before he left his own village to seek a wife, he had an
[837] affair with the wife of an older brother. When he was discovered, his brother attacked
[593] him with a club. Rerebawä was infuriated so he grabbed an axe and drove his brother
[578] out of the village after soundly beating him with the flat of the blade. The brother was so afraid that he did not return to the village for several days. I recently visited his village with him. He made a point to introduce me to this brother. Rerebawä dragged him out of his hammock by the arm and told me, "This is the brother whose wife I had an affair with," a deadly insult. His brother did nothing and slunk back into his hammock, shamed, but relieved to have Rerebawä release the vise-grip on his arm.

[829] Despite the fact that he admires Kąobawä, he has a low opinion of the others in Bisaasi-teri. He admitted confidentially that he thought Bisaasi-teri was an abominable group: "This is a terrible neighborhood! All the young men are lazy and cowards and everybody is committing incest! I'll be glad to get back home." He also admired Kąobawä's brother, the headman of Monou-teri. This man was killed by raiders while I was doing my fieldwork. Rerebawä was disgusted that the others did not chase the raiders when they discovered the shooting: "He was the only fierce one in the whole group; he was my close friend. The cowardly Monou-teri hid like women in the jungle and didn't even chase the raiders!"

[156] Even though Rerebawä is fierce and capable of being quite nasty, he has a good
[522] side as well. He has a very biting sense of humor and can entertain the group for hours on end with jokes and witty comments. And, he is one of few Yąnomamö that I feel I can trust. When I returned to Bisaasi-teri after having been away for a year, Rerebawä was in his own village visiting his kinsmen. Word reached him that I had returned, and

11: Chagnon R-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18



Fig. 3–1. Ideal Yanomamö marriage pattern.

Fig. 3–1 can be presumed to represent the organization of a particular village over five generations, starting in the year 1888. Let us assume that the village originated in that year when individuals x_1 (and his sister, not numbered) and y_1 (and his sister) broke away from a larger village and established their own garden at some new location. Thus, in the year 1888, the village was comprised of two groups of kinsmen, X and Y. These two kinship groups are called lineages, the distinctive features of which I will discuss later.

In generation I, x_1 married the sister of y_1 and, in exchange, gave his own sister to y_1 as wife. This marriage practice is called *brother-sister* exchange and characterizes Yanomamö marriage behavior. A man is under considerable obligation to reciprocate a woman to the kinship group from which he has taken one. In Fig. 3–1, x_1 married y_1's sister and reciprocated the exchange by giving his own sister to y_1. Because of this obligation of reciprocity, kinship groups become interdependent socially and form pairs of woman-exchanging kin groups. These paired kinship groups are discussed below in the context of village fissioning.

In generation II of Fig. 3–1, the village still contains only two groups of intermarrying kinsmen. These are the children of the individuals who founded the village. The reciprocal exchanges of women between the two groups of kinsmen (lineages X and Y) continue in the second generation, x_2 getting his wife from lineage Y and vice versa. Like their fathers, x_2 and y_2 exchanged sisters. It will be noted at this point that x_2 has married his mother's brother's daughter, who is simultaneously his father's sister's daughter.[1] This is a logical consequence of the fact that there are only *two* lineages in

[1] This is called bilateral cross-cousin marriage. See glossary for definitions. Hereafter the following abbreviations will be used, following Murdock, 1949: Mo—mother; Fa—father; Br—brother; Si—sister; So—son; and Da—daughter. Thus, "mother's brother's daughter" is simply MoBrDa.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

These figures represent a *sample* of marriages in the two villages. The sample consists of all married males who are thirty-five years old or younger. The sample was chosen in this fashion because the analysis of the marriage types depends on genealogical information covering several generations. By selecting only the younger men the analysis can be quite easily undertaken. In Patanowã-teri there were 38 men of this category, many of whom had multiple wives. A man with four wives, therefore, represents four marriages. In Lower Bisaasi-teri only 10 married men were below thirty-five years of age and accounted for the seventeen marriages. If all the men were included, the analysis would be inaccurate because I do not have adequately long genealogies for some of the oldest men. Up to 1940, the villages of Patanowã-teri and Lower Bisaasi-teri were not separate entities; they separated from each other at about that time. Patanowã-teri is a large and powerful village, containing 212 people. Lower Bisaasi-teri, with only 51 people, is militarily dependent on several of its allies.

Four types of marriages are shown in Table 3–2. The term prescriptive refers to the kinds of marriages described in Fig. 3–2. An incestuous marriage is defined as a man marrying a woman of his own patrilineage (or his mother or niece reckoned through his mother's side of the family). Marriages resulting from either alliance or abduction have been lumped into a single category because they represent the recruitment of spouses from outside the group. Finally, a few marriages are unexplainable in terms of Yąnomamõ kinship and marriage equations; these represent marriages between members of distinct lineages that have recently entered into exchanges with each other.

As can be seen from Table 3–2, there is a major difference between the two villages in the proportion of prescriptive marriages on the one hand and alliance marriages on the other. In short, the Patanowã-teri follow their marriage prescriptions far more rigorously than do the Lower Bisaasi-teri. This is so because Patanowã-teri, a much larger village, does not need to enter into marriage alliances with its neighbors; it is politically and militarily capable of an autonomous existence. Most of the alliance-abduction marriages in Patanowã-teri are, in fact, abductions; in Bisaasi-teri most of them are alliance marriages. Therefore, the relative frequency of alliance-type marriages is much lower for Patanowã-teri than for Lower Bisaasi-teri. This difference in marriage behavior stems from the relative abilities of the two groups to maintain military autonomy in a milieu of chronic warfare, a quality that is largely a function of the size of the group. The members of a militarily vulnerable village will breach the marriage prescriptions in order to establish political alliances with neighboring groups by ceding women to them.

TABLE 3–2
MARRIAGE TYPES IN PATANOWÃ-TERI AND LOWER BISAASI-TERI

	Patanowã-teri	Lower Bisaasi-teri
1. Prescriptive	37	7
2. Incestuous	4	1
3. Alliance and/or abduction	8	9
4. Unexplained	3	0
Totals:	52	17

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Kąobawä's group. All their other neighbors, allied to the victims of the treacherous feast, relentlessly raided them. They were, in short, extremely dependent on Kąobawä's group and the two other villages related to Kąobawä's group.

Kąobawä and his followers have astutely finessed this situation in two ways. First, they have managed to coerce the two Shamatari villages into ceding women without reciprocating an equal number of their own in return. The men who have obtained Shamatari wives have, as well, managed to cut short their period of bride service in the Shamatari village. Conversely, Shamatari men who have been promised women of Kąobawä's group are pressed into very lengthy bride service, sometimes up to three years. Secondly, Kąobawä's group has prevented the two Shamatari allies from re-establishing friendly contacts with the other Shamatari to their southeast by chicane, threat, and intimidation. One of the two Shamatari allies, the Reyaboböwei-teri, has attempted a rapprochement with the Shamatari enemies of Kąobawä's group. In 1965, several months after I had been living in Kąobawä's village, Kąobawä's group managed to stage another treacherous feast for the old enemies by taking advantage of the renewed ties between the Reyaboböwei-teri and the enemies. They learned that the Reyaboböwei-teri planned to invite one of the villages to a feast, so they, along with the Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Mõmariböwei-teri, went to the feast in order to ambush the guests. The Reyaboböwei-teri, however, were reluctant to go through with the plan and warned the visitors about it. The visitors were en route to the village when word of the treachery reached them. This had the effect of creating even more difficulties for the Reyaboböwei-teri, for it is highly unlikely that they will succeed in gaining the confidence of their neighbors to the southeast. Nevertheless, some visiting between the groups still continues.[17]

The historical relationships between the villages helps account for the reasons behind contemporary alliance patterns. The discrepancy between marriage rules and actual marriage practice in Lower Bisaasi-teri is a result of the political advantages that group enjoys over one of its allies. It has used this advantage to gain a favorable imbalanced marriage exchange pattern, but one that is only temporary. The Shamatari are also shrewd in their alliance practices, and have succeeded in neutralizing their disadvantages by capitalizing on schisms between Kąobawä's group and Lower Bisaasi-teri. This has been done largely by confining their marriage exchanges to important men in the dominant lineages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri. One of the Shamatari villages, Mõmaribowei-teri, has restricted its exchanges to Lower Bisaasi-teri and Monou-teri, while completely ignoring Upper Bisaasi-teri. The other Shamatari village has given its women only to Upper Bisaasi-teri. This has resulted in the weakening of ties between the three villages of Upper Bisaasi-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Monou-teri, whose members are

[17] I plan to use these visiting ties to establish contact with the Shamatari villages in that area, none of which have had contact with outsiders. These uncontacted Shamatari, however, know who I am because I attempted to reach them in 1965. They subsequently sent a message out urging me to visit them, angry because my guides forced me to turn back on my first attempt. In 1966 they even sent an old man to Kąobawä's village by way of Reyaboböwei-teri with an invitation for me to visit them. I had already left Venezuela by that time. Most of the men in the two contacted Shamatari villages tried to prevent me from going by telling horrible tales of the treachery that awaited my visit, describing how the Shamatari will kill me. The truth of the matter is that they know that I will bring the uncontacted Shamatari machetes and axes that might otherwise be given to them. The kindness of one of the uncontacted villages has a brother in Mõmariböwei-teri. He privately conceded that no harm would befall me and offered to take me to visit in 1967. He was, unfortunately, bitten by a snake just before I arrived in March of 1967, and my plans were deferred until 1968.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

of other villages—such alliances are stabilized by exchanges of women between the partners, a breach of the prescriptive marriage rules. It is for this reason that such a large discrepancy exists between the ideal behavior and the actual practice, as noted in Table 2.[18]

Division of Labor and Daily Social Life

The daily activities and general social life are not as circumscribed by rules and regulations as would appear from the foregoing discussion. In fact, one first has the impression that chaos rather than order reigns over the daily activities of the village members.[19] Thus, while ideal rules about behavior definitely exist, individuals have a great deal of freedom to manipulate their behavior in such a way that they are not unduly encumbered by them. Most of the run-of-the-mill activities of daily life are not characterized by inflexible prescriptions regarding proper behavior.

MALE-FEMALE DIVISION There are a number of distinctions based on status differences that are important in daily life. Perhaps the most conspicuous and most important is the distinction between males and females.

Yąnomamö society is decidedly masculine. As was discussed earlier, there is a definite preference to have male children, resulting in a higher incidence of female infanticide as opposed to male infanticide. Female children assume duties and responsibilities in the household long before their brothers are obliged to participate in useful domestic tasks. For the most part, little girls are obliged to tend their younger brothers and sisters, although they are also expected to help their mothers in other chores such as cooking, hauling water, and collecting firewood. By the time girls have reached puberty they have already learned that their world is decidedly less attractive than that of their brothers.

As members of local descent groups, girls have almost no voice in the decisions reached by their agnates concerning their marriage. They are largely pawns to be disposed of by their kinsmen, and their wishes are given very little consideration. In many cases, the girl has been promised to a man long before she reaches puberty, and in some cases her husband actually raises her for part of her childhood. In short, they do not participate as equals in the political affairs of the corporate kinship group and seem to inherit most of the duties without enjoying many of the privileges.

Marriage does not enhance the status of the girl, for her duties as wife require her to assume difficult and laborious tasks [illegible] the most part these include the incessant demands for firewood and drinking water, particularly the former. Women spend several hours each day scouring the neighborhood

[18]Reducing kinship usage to the logical extremes to which the Yąnomamö take it, there really is no discrepancy between theory and practice, except in the case of incest. When new villages enter into contact for the first time, their respective headmen call each other *shoriwä* (brother-in-law). The first exchanges between the groups usually involve the children of these men. The children, of course, stand in marriageable relationship to each other because the children of brothers-in-law can, by the prescriptive definitions, marry.

[19]Many fieldworkers do not begin to see the patterns of behavior until they have spent months of intensive contact with their subjects. I was convinced, after five or six months, that there were almost no guidelines for behavior. A part of the difficulty resulted from the language barrier. The patterns began to emerge only after about six months, and only then could I begin asking pertinent questions about many features of social organization.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

Other status differences do exist and account for some variation in the activities of particular individuals. Rerebawä, for example, is an outsider to Kaobawä's group and has no intention of joining the village as a permanent resident. Consequently, he does not participate in the gardening activities and has considerably more spare time than other married men. He spends this time hunting for his wife and her parents, one of his obligations as a son-in-law. He is quite dependent on them for the bulk of his diet because they provide him with all his plantains. This is perhaps why he takes his hunting obligations so seriously and gives his game away so unflinchingly. He is quick to make reference to his hunting skills and generosity, perhaps to draw attention away from the fact that he does not cultivate food for his wife and children. He has been able to avoid making a garden because of his status as an outsider; he plans to return to his own village as soon as his bride service is over. But his in-laws want him to stay permanently so that he will be able to provide them with meat and garden produce when they are old. They have no sons to do this for them and have even promised Rerebawä their second daughter on the condition that he remain permanently in the village. They prevent Rerebawä from taking his wife and children home by keeping at least one of the children with them when Rerebawä goes to visit his own family. They know that his wife could not bear to be separated permanently from her child, and Rerebawä invariably brings her back home so that she can be with the child.

By Yanomamö standards he has done enough bride service and deserves to be given his wife. Also, by their standards he has lived in the village so long that he should be obliged to make his own garden. But he can legitimately refuse to do this because he has discharged his obligations well beyond what was expected of him.

Kaobawä, on the other hand, has the special status of being his group's headman. Apart from this, he is also some fifteen years senior to Rerebawä and has a higher sense of obligation and responsibility to his family. Rerebawä, in addition to refusing to make a garden, thinks nothing of taking a week-long trip to visit friends, leaving his wife and children with her parents. His attitude toward the children, compared to Kaobawä's, is rather indifferent. Kaobawä had planned to accompany me to Caracas to see how foreigners live until Ariwari began crying and appealed to his father's paternal sensitivities. Kaobawä stepped out of the canoe, took off the clothing I had loaned him, and picked up Ariwari; "I can't go with you," he explained, "Ariwari will miss me and be sad."

Kaobawä thinks for the others in the village, many of whom are not able to perceive some of the less obvious implications of situations. In political matters he is the most astute man in group, but he so diplomatically exercises his influence that the others are not offended. Should someone be planning to do something that is potentially dangerous, he simply points out the danger and adds parenthetically, "Go ahead and do it if you want to, but don't expect sympathy from me if you get hurt." Sharuaiwä, his youngest brother, planned to take a trip to a distant village with me. I knew that the two villages were not on particularly good terms with each other, but they were not actively at war. Kaobawä arrived at my canoe just as we were about to depart and asked me not to take Sharuaiwä along, explaining that the Iyawei-teri might possibly molest him and precipitate hostilities between the two groups. Sharuaiwä was willing to take a chance that my presence would be sufficient to deter any potential trouble, but Kaobawä would not risk it.

On another occasion a group of men from Patanowä-teri arrived to explore with